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Abstract: The European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) constitutes the Union’s first genuine instrument of direct 
democracy. The first experiences with regard to its deployment have however proved disappointing, 
criticism of the instrument is mounting, and suggestions for reform abound. This raises the question 
whether the ECI holds any genuine potential to enhance the legitimacy of the EU – or whether it should  at 
least in this regard be considered an ineffective, misguided experiment instead. The current paper provides 
a response by triangulating three types of data: legal insight and argument, empirical information with 
regard to the functioning of the instrument in the first five years of its operation, and a rational assessment 
of the procedure, now and in the future. This allows for a comprehensive reflection on the impact the ECI 
has had, and what impact it may yet have in the long or medium term, on the overall legitimacy of the EU.
Keywords: European integration; EU governance; EU institutions; EU public policy; legitimacy; agenda-
setting; European Citizens’ Initiative; democratic deficit.
1  Introduction
A core insight in European Union studies is that legitimacy constitutes an important requirement for the 
EU to be effective and durable. There exists a broad consensus that the EU suffers from a democratic deficit 
that affects its legitimacy.1 Especially after the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by French and Dutch 
voters in 2005, both the European Commission and the European Council became fully aware of the need to 
take action. Accordingly, they sought to enhance the Union’s legitimacy, primarily through strengthening 
the roles of the European Parliament and national parliaments in legislative decision-making.2 These 
investments in representative democracy are warranted by the fact that democracy arguably constitutes 
the central means for legitimising political power.3 In the EU context, legitimacy and democratic legitimacy 
have even been considered interchangeable concepts.4 In line with this observation, Beetham and Lord 
1  See e.g. D. Grimm, ‘The Democratic Costs of Constitutionalisation: The European Case’ (2015) 21 European Law Journal 460, 465.
2  See e.g. D. Jancic, ‘The Game of Cards: National Parliaments in the EU and the Future of the Early Warning Mechanism and 
the Political Dialogue’, (2015) 52 Common Market Law Review 939-976; more generally, see D. Chalmers, M. Jachtenfuchs and C. 
Joerges (eds.), The End of the Eurocrats’ Dream (Cambridge University Press, 2016).
3  A. Føllesdal, ‘The Legitimacy Deficits of the European Union’, (2006) 14 Journal of Political Philosophy 441-468, 448.
4  K. Lenaerts and M. Desomer, ‘New Models of Constitution-making in Europe: The Quest for Legitimacy’, (2002) 39 Common 
Market Law Review 1217-1253, 1220.
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have analysed the EU’s legitimacy from the vantage point of representative democracy.5 As asserted by 
Grimm however, the problem of democratic government is that the people are the source of all public 
authority, but cannot govern themselves.6
The European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI), as the Union’s first ‘experiment in direct democracy’, could be 
seen as an alternative institutional vehicle for enhancing EU legitimacy, similar to instruments existing 
at the national level.7 In a notable break with the  past, where they had, as such, no role to play in the 
decision-making trajectory, it allows citizens to invite the Commission to submit a legislative proposal on a 
matter they deem important.8 According to Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič, the ECI is to ‘foster a European 
public space, widen the sphere of public debate across Europe and bring the EU closer to the concerns of 
the citizens’.9 In its first Report on the functioning of the instrument, the Commission underscored that the 
instrument ‘aims to further strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the Union’.10 
Whether the ECI can ever fulfil these high hopes, even in a modified form, remains to be seen. It initi-
ally triggered a modest, and inevitably speculative scholarly debate.11 At present, it has become possible to 
provide an empirical assessment of the key question: does the ECI indeed possess the potential to enhance 
the legitimacy of the EU, or should it be discarded as an ineffective, misguided experiment instead? To this 
effect, the current paper will provide a measured, contextual analysis of, first, how the instrument and 
its operationalisation holds up against criteria of democratic legitimacy and, secondly, how the Union’s 
legitimacy has been impacted – or how it may yet be impacted in the near future.
The bare numbers hitherto are already quite impressive: a total of more than nine million citizens have 
supported an ECI, with three campaigns even collecting more than one million signatures each.12 Despite 
this impressive tally, the Commission, the Ombudsman and NGOs are actively monitoring the efficacy of 
the instrument, contemplating reforms to improve its accessibility and usefulness.13 Up until now however, 
few studies have focused squarely on its legitimacy-enhancing potential.14 The current paper aims to fill 
this gap, seeking to evaluate the relevant procedural characteristics, as well as the empirical evidence for 
its realisation. The analysis is a contextual one, in that it is based on a set of normative criteria developed 
in the legal and the political science literature on legitimacy, incorporating also relevant findings from the 
field of social psychology. We hereby triangulate three types of data: legal insights and argument; empiri-
cal information with regard to the functioning of the ECI and similar instruments in national states; and 
rational assessments of the procedures that have been established.
5  D. Beetham and C. Lord, Legitimacy and the European Union (Longman, 1998).
6  Grimm, supra n. 1, at 461.
7  L. Maduz, ‘Direct Democracy’, (2010) 2 Living Reviews in Democracy 1-14, 7.
8  B. Kaufman, ‘Transnational “Babystep”: The European Citizens’ Initiative’, in M. Setälä and T. Schiller (eds.), Citizens’ 
Initiatives in Europe: Procedures and Consequences of Agenda-Setting by Citizens (Palgrave, 2012) 228-242, 232.
9  M. Šefčovič, ‘The Citizens and the Treaty of Lisbon’ (Hearing organized by the Representation of the European Commission at 
the Portuguese Parliament, Lisbon, 23 March 2010, <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-10-116_en.htm?locale=en>, 
last visited 10 July 2018), at 3.
10  European Commission, ‘Report on the application of Regulation (EU) No 211/2011 on the citizens’ initiative’, COM 2015(145) 
final, at 2.
11  M. Dougan, ‘What Are We to Make of the Citizens’ Initiative?’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 1807-1848; V. Cuesta-
López, ‘A Comparative Approach to the Regulation on the European Citizens’ Initiative’  (2012) 13 Perspectives on European 
Politics and Society 257-269; Kaufman, supra n. 8; F. Dehousse, ‘The European Citizens’ Initiative: Next Big Thing or New False 
Good Idea?’, Egmont Paper 59/2013; E. Monaghan, ‘Assessing Participation and Democracy in the EU: The Case of the European 
Citizens’ Initiative’ (2012) 13 Perspectives on European Politics and Society 285-298; M. Sangsari, ‘The European Citizens’ 
Initiative: An Early Assessment of the European Union’s New Participatory Democracy Instrument’, Canada-Europe Dialogue 
Paper, January 2013.
12  European Commission, ‘Report on the application of Regulation (EU) No 211/2011 on the citizens’ initiative’, COM 2015(145) 
final, at 2.
13  In similar vein, C. Berg and J. Thomson (eds.), ‘An ECI that Works! Learning from the First Two Years of the European 
Citizens’ Initiative’, e-book available at <http://ecithatworks.org> (last visited 10 July 2018).
14  cf more obliquely C. Kentmen-Cin, ‘Explaining Willingness to Use the European Citizens’ Initiative: Political Cynicism, 
Anti-EU Attitudes and Voting Weight of Member States’ (2014) 12 Comparative European Politics 301-318.
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The paper consists of three parts. It starts by giving a succinct overview of the ECI’s origins and pro-
cedural framework, presenting a useful reminder of the original intentions, and valuable background for 
our analysis (II). Next, we develop the normative criteria that inform our evaluation, arranged under the 
headings of input and throughput legitimacy (III). We subsequently apply those criteria to the operation 
of the European Citizens’ Initiative (IV). While scrutinizing the legal arrangements, particular attention is 
devoted to how the Commission has interpreted the rules, and the consequences of these interpretations. 
Hereby, we draw from the experiences acquired during the first five years of its operation (2012-2017). On 
the basis of these findings, we consider what influence the instrument has so far exerted, and may still 
exert in the long or medium term, on the overall legitimacy of the EU (V). The final section concludes (VI). 
2  The European Citizens’ Initiative: Origin and Procedural 
Framework
2.1  Conception and Development
The ECI’s legal basis is contained in articles 10 and 11 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), and Article 
24 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Notably, Article 10 TEU holds that the 
functioning of the Union is predicated on the principle of representative democracy, and that every citizen 
has the right to participate in the EU’s democratic life. Article 11(4) of the Treaty sets out the core concept, 
stipulating that ‘[n]ot less than one million citizens who are nationals of a significant number of Member 
States may take the initiative of inviting the European Commission, within the framework of its powers, 
to submit any appropriate proposal on matters where citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is 
required for the purpose of implementing the Treaties’.15
Article 24 TFEU calls upon the Parliament and the Council to adopt regulations detailing the further 
conditions and procedures, including the minimum number of Member States from which the citizens 
concerned should come. In December 2009, the Commission published a Green Paper, inviting comments 
from relevant stakeholders. During this consultation phase, several of the Commission’s ideas on operati-
onalisation of the ECI attracted immediate criticism. The main complaint was that the envisaged country 
threshold, requiring that signatories come from at least one-third of Member States, was too demanding.16 
The draft of the first Regulation was tabled in March 2010. It sparked off a protracted period of negotia-
tions between the Commission, Council and Parliament, striving to reach consensus on the instrument’s 
practical modus operandi. Particularly contentious proved the eligibility criteria for signing an ECI, the 
timeframe for signature collection, and the methods of verifying their authenticity – issues that would also 
stir up trouble later, as further elaborated upon below. In November 2010, final agreement was attained, 
and the Regulation was officially adopted in February 2011. Additional patience was required though, as it 
only became fully operational from 1 April 2012 onwards.
The first official report on the functioning of the ECI, issued in 2015, listed a number of challenges 
in the implementation of the regulation, ranging from technical or logistical aspects to issues of a more 
political nature.17 It triggered a process of review, collecting ideas on ways to improve its implementation 
via consultations with, and contributions from various stakeholders and interlocutors, including advisory 
bodies and EU institutions. The Parliament also adopted a resolution calling for a substantial regulatory 
overhaul.18 In September 2017, the Commission adopted a draft for a recast instrument, followed in mid-
15  For an elaborate scrutiny of the first three paragraphs, see J. Mendes, ‘Participation and the Role of Law after Lisbon: A 
Legal View on Article 11 TEU’, (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review, 1849-1878.
16  Dougan, supra n. 11, at 1810.
17  European Commission, supra n. 10.
18  European Parliament, Resolution of 28 October 2015 on the European Citizens’ Initiative (2014/2257(INI)).
Brought to you by | Radboud University Nijmegen
Authenticated
Download Date | 1/4/19 3:22 PM
78    Ellen Mastenbroek, Henri de Waele
2018 by the official second report on the ECI’s functioning.19 At the time of writing, the eventual contents 
of an amended Regulation, and even the actual materialisation thereof, remain highly unsure.
2.2  Procedural Framework
The ECI procedure as currently laid down in Regulation 211/2011 consists of several steps, which deserve 
to be briefly mentioned. First, a so-called ‘Citizens Committee’ must be formed, consisting of at least seven 
natural persons holding the nationality of one of the EU Member States, eligible to vote in the EP elections. 
These persons should come from different Member States. The Citizens Committee then is to register the 
proposed Initiative with the Commission. It must specify inter alia the exact title, subject matter, underlying 
objectives, and received or projected sources of funding. If the proposal meets the criteria of Regulation 
211/2011, the Commission shall indicate this in its response, to be provided within two months upon receipt, 
and proceed to officially register the ECI. At this stage, the limitative grounds of rejection are that the 
proposed Initiative falls manifestly outside the framework of the Commission’s powers to submit a draft 
legal act for the purpose of implementing the Treaties; that it is manifestly abusive, frivolous or vexatious; 
or that it contravenes any of the Union’s values as set out in Article 2 TEU. Should the Commission proceed 
to a rejection, it explicitly has to invoke one of these grounds in its response to the Citizens Committee.
After registration of the proposal, the organisers can commence the collection of the individual statements 
of support.20 Only individuals holding the nationality of an EU Member State who are eligible to vote in 
EP elections may endorse an ECI. Crucially, the signatories should come from at least one quarter of the 
total number of EU Member States (currently: seven countries). Moreover, the number of signatories per 
country should at least comprise the specific minimum stipulated in Annex I of the Regulation. These 
thresholds mean to ensure a sufficiently broad backing for proposed Initiatives across the EU. In addition, 
heed should be taken of the timeframe for attaining the required minimum of one million signatories, 
namely twelve months maximum. At the end of this twelve-month circulation period, the organisers are 
to request the designated authorities in the pertinent Member States to verify and certify the statements of 
support. Hereafter, the proposed Initiative can be submitted to the Commission. Ordinarily, the latter will 
then proceed to publish it in the register of ECIs that have fulfilled all applicable thresholds. The organisers 
must be received ‘at an appropriate level’, and shall be granted the opportunity to present their Initiative 
at a public EP hearing.
Within three months after submission, the Commission has to communicate its legal and political 
conclusions, outline the action it intends to take, if any, along with the reasons for its decision. Should the 
organisers wish to appeal that decision, they may bring proceedings before the EU’s General Court under 
Article 263 TFEU. Alternatively, in case of perceived maladministration, they may file a complaint with the 
European Ombudsman on the basis of Article 228 TFEU. By now, both avenues have been tried and tested, 
as further discussed below.
19  European Commission, ‘Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Citizens’ 
Initiative’, COM 2017(482) final; European Commission, ‘Second Report on the application of Regulation (EU) No 211/2011 on 
the citizens’ initiative’, COM 2018(15) final.
20  These may be collected in either electronic of paper form, while complying with the standard format included in Annex 
III to the Regulation.
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3  Evaluative Foundations – Criteria for Legitimacy 
3.1  Antecedents of Legitimacy
As noted above, legitimacy can be defined as the perceived ‘right to rule’.21 Arguably, this right to rule 
is seriously contested in the case of the EU.22 The core of the problem is that the Union is said to lack 
‘diffuse’ democratic legitimacy: legitimacy of the political order as a whole, its key regime principles, or the 
political community.23 Such diffuse legitimacy is essential, because it functions as a generalized ‘reservoir 
of support’ for authorities.24 It consequently leads to a general willingness to obey rules beyond immediate 
self-interest, regardless of the perceived merits of these rules.25 The lack of this diffuse legitimacy in the 
EU is contended to lead to a necessity of obtaining more specific legitimacy, i.e. concerning a particular 
political decision or political actor, primarily in particular decision-making processes.26
Over time, various European integration scholars have sought to identify the antecedents of and 
solutions for the EU’s democratic legitimacy gap. Surveying the relevant literature, both Wimmel and 
Schmidt have suggested three ‘legitimacy variables’ that may foster democratic legitimacy: input, output, 
and throughput.27 This typology, derived from the systemic view of legitimacy developed by Scharpf, has 
been fruitfully employed to analyse the legitimising potential of particular decision-making instruments.28 
According to this systemic perspective, the first factor leading to legitimacy concerns participation, or the 
direct and indirect opportunities for citizens to influence policies.29 The ECI, given its character of ‘citizen-
initiated agenda-setting tool’ should primarily be seen as an instrument for enhancing the EU’s input 
legitimacy, as it allows citizens to directly channel their demands into the political system.
21  R. Flathman, ‘Legitimacy’, in R.E. Goodin, P. Petitt and T. Pogge (eds.), A Companion to Political Philosophy – Vol. 2 
(Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 678-684, 678.
22  Beetham and Lord, supra n. 5; F. Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? (OUP, 1999); A. Føllesdal and S. 
Hix, ‘Why There Is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik’, (2006) 44 Journal of Common Market 
Studies 533-562; but see G. Majone, ‘Europe’s “Democratic Deficit”: The Question of Standards’, (1998) 4 European Law Journal 
5-28; A. Moravcsik, ‘Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union’, (2002) 40 Journal of Common Market Studies 603-624.
23  Føllesdal, supra n. 3, 450-451. A. Wimmel, ‘Theorizing Democratic Legitimacy of European Governance: A Labyrinth With 
No Exit?’ (2009) 31 European Integration 181-199, at 188-189, similarly distinguishes between three objects of legitimacy: the 
EU’s political system, its institutions, and particular policy decisions
24  As argued by Beetham and Lord (supra n. 5), the EU also taps two additional sources of legitimacy, an indirect and a 
technocratic type. In the present analysis, we bracket both of these and focus on direct, i.e. democratic legitimacy.
25  T. Tyler, ‘Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation’, (2006) 57 Annual Review of Psychology 375-400, 381; 
Flathman, supra n. 21, at 678.
26  Majone, supra n. 22; Føllesdal, supra n. 3. A crucial hypothesis from social psychology is that diffuse legitimacy derives 
from a history of particular events like concrete decisions made; see e.g. M. Suchman, ‘Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and 
Institutional Approaches’, (1995) 20 Academy of Management Review, 3571-610, 574; M. Grimes, ‘Organizing Consent: The Role 
of Procedural Fairness in Political Trust and Compliance’, (2006) 45 European Journal of Political Research 285-315, 286; A. 
Gangl, ‘Procedural Justice Theory and Evaluations of the Lawmaking Process’ (2003) 25 Political Behavior 119-149. Our analysis 
of the ECI is based on this implicit view, which also transpires from other evaluations of EU decision-making procedures; see 
e.g. Lenaerts and Desomer, supra n. 4; T. Risse and M. Kleine, ‘Assessing the Legitimacy of the EU’s Treaty Revision Methods’, 
(2007) 45 Journal of Common Market Studies 69-80.
27  Wimmel, supra n. 23; V. Schmidt, ‘Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Input, Output, and 
“Throughput”’, (2013) 61 Political Studies 2-22, 3. Lord and Magnette have proposed a cross-cutting typology, consisting of 
four vectors: indirect, parliamentary, technocratic, and procedural (see C. Lord and P. Magnette, ‘E Pluribus Unum? Creative 
Disagreement about Legitimacy in the EU’, (2004) 42 Journal of Common Market Studies 183-202). In our view, procedural 
legitimacy is an addition to input and output legitimacy. In addition, as follows from our focus on direct democracy, the 
indirect, parliamentary, and technocratic vectors are not relevant to our analysis. Also, the input-throughput-output distinction 
is fairly close to the four legitimising means suggested by Føllesdal (supra n. 3, 448-449): democratic rule, participation/
consent, and output.
28  Lenaerts and Desomer, supra n. 4; Risse and Kleine, supra n. 27.
29  Wimmel, supra n. 23, 190; Schmidt, supra n. 27, 2.
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A second factor on which legitimacy has been argued to depend is throughput, or ‘the procedural 
mechanisms of decision-making in the European multi-level system’.30 Throughput quality is argued to 
be an important requirement for building EU democratic legitimacy, since ‘bad throughput (…) regularly 
undermines public perceptions of the legitimacy of EU governance, regardless of how extensive the input 
(…)’.31 This view equally transpires from the social psychology literature about legitimacy, which has 
shown that the perceived procedural fairness in specific decision-making processes is an important pre-
dictor of compliance across a great variety of social settings, amongst which law-making.32 Even if the ECI 
should be primarily understood as an instrument on the input side of politics, the quality of the processes 
that follow citizens’ inputs also seem an important requirement for the ECI to affect legitimacy.
A third factor affecting legitimacy is output.33 Legitimacy in this perspective derives from the quality 
of the results of a political system – notably effectiveness of EU policy outcomes for the people.34  Output 
legitimacy, however, seems not very relevant to our analysis of the ECI’s legitimising potential, because the 
instrument only provides for a potential intermediate output: a legislative proposal by the Commission, 
which enters the regular legislative and decision-making process.
Our analysis will hence revolve around input and throughput legitimacy. In their general form though, 
these variables do not suffice for our evaluative purposes; they must be detailed into specific, inter-subjec-
tive yardsticks that can guide our analysis.35 In order to do so, we combine the most recent legal and poli-
tical science insights on the notion with more specific literature on representative and direct democracy.36
3.2  Conceptualising Input Legitimacy
Input legitimacy refers to the ‘participatory quality of the process leading to laws and rules as ensured by 
the “majoritarian” institutions of electoral representation’.37 The main standards under this heading have 
been derived from representative democracy literature, some of which are also pertinent to our analysis.38 
A first specific standard is equal access, e.g. the question whether all citizens are equal before the law.39 
In the case of the ECI, equal access would imply that citizens in various Member States face the same 
conditions for tabling an Initiative.40 The argument here is basically pluralist in nature: to what extent do 
various groups in society have equal access to a political system – in this case to the process of agenda-
setting by the Commission, which despite the ECI retains its unique right of initiative? As such, the ECI – 
being an instrument of direct democracy – can be seen as a further check on the centrality of a technocratic 
actor – the Commission – in the Union’s legislative process, complementing the growing importance of the 
European Council in EU agenda setting. 
In addition, input legitimacy requires several constructive preconditions, particularly the presence 
of a thick collective identity, and a European demos.41 These preconditions are crucial for a democratic 
30  Wimmel, supra n. 23, 191.
31  Schmidt, supra n. 27, 3.
32  Tyler, supra n. 25.
33  Wimmel, supra n. 23, 191.
34  Schmidt, supra n. 27, 2; Scharpf, supra n. 22, 11.
35  A.I. Applbaum, ‘Culture, Identity, and Legitimacy’, in J.S. Nye and J.D. Donahue (eds.), Governance in a Globalizing World 
(Brookings Institute, 2000), 319-329, 325.
36  It must be noted that at this point, we cannot make firm judgments about the relative importance, sufficiency/necessity and 
mutual interdependencies of these criteria. We bracket these complicated questions, as these have not received unequivocal 
answers in the underlying normative literature on EU legitimacy; providing or testing these answers would go beyond the 
applied nature of our analysis.
37  Schmidt, supra n. 27, 4.
38  See e.g. Beetham and Lord, supra n. 5; J. Thomassen, The Legitimacy of the European Union after Enlargement (OUP, 2009).
39  L.J. Diamond and L. Morlino (eds.), Assessing the Quality of Democracy (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004).
40  A second standard for representative democracy, competition, in the sense of regular, free, and fair electoral competition, 
is not relevant for our purposes, although it must be noted that competition is relevant for referenda.
41  Scharpf, supra n. 22.
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system to function properly, because they attenuate the threatening character of majority rule.42 Arguably, 
these important preconditions are absent in the EU; ‘a sense of European identity and loyalty is embryonic 
at best’.43 This absence of identity leads to the importance of alternative legitimising mechanisms. Lord 
and Beetham stress the importance of ‘legitimation by constraint’: the idea that legitimacy is more likely 
when power is credibly limited, and majorities restrained, for instance through separation of powers or 
use of super-majorities.44 At the same time, the challenge is not to compromise policy performance, which 
carries a Janus-like quality.45 Given the fact that instruments of direct democracy harbour the risk of use 
by popular majorities seeking to reduce minority rights, and possibly even a risk of capture by minority 
special interests, an important standard seems to be that, in line with pluralist theory, the demands inser-
ted into the political system should be representative of the general consensus which defines the limits of 
political actions and the framework of policy outcomes46– our second evaluative standard.47 This criterion 
is meant to balance direct democratic legitimacy, flowing straight from EU citizens to the EU decision 
making machinery, with indirect democratic legitimacy, which in the EU is guaranteed by its quasi-federal 
character, providing democratically mandated and scrutinized national governments a central position in 
decision-making.
A first way of preventing unrepresentative demands from being put on the agenda through the ECI lies 
in the legality of the popular demands put on the political agenda.48 Since all primary law at least has been 
derived from the unanimous preferences of the governments representing the European peoples, this is 
the closest we get to guaranteeing that politics reflects the wishes of the majority of Europeans. Therefore, 
for the ECI to be legitimate, so-called qualifiers limiting the range of topics that may be covered by the 
proposal are required.49 A second way of preventing truly unrepresentative demands is by ensuring broad 
support of the demands inserted into the political system through the ECI. This can be done by requiring 
a high signature quorum for Citizens’ Initiatives, also ensuring a broad geographical basis.50 Third, the 
specific risk of interest group capture, which is argued to be high for instruments of direct democracy, 
should be prevented.51 Mainly so as not to bias usage, citizens should be able to bear the financial costs 
of registering their initiative and obtaining signatures. Finally, checks and balances in the EU decision-
making process may function to correct any small minority positions channelled into the political system. 
Given the ECI’s character of instrument for agenda influence, the regular direct and indirect democratic 
checks and balances the EU has institutionalized, are relevant. The Initiative is nothing more than a right 
to place a particular topic on the agenda, subjected to further decision-making, with the Parliament and 
the Council providing a further democratic check on the process.
3.3  Conceptualizing Throughput Legitimacy
Throughput legitimacy concerns the internal processes and practices of governance, or what goes on in 
the ‘black box’ after an input into the EU policy-making is provided.52 Throughput legitimacy implies 
‘the perception of those addressed by a rule or a rule-making institution that the rule or institution has 
42  ibid, 7.
43  Beetham and Lord, supra n. 5, 29.
44  C. Lord and D. Beetham, ‘Legitimizing the EU: Is There a “Post-parliamentary Basis” For Its Legitimation?’, (2001) 39 
Journal of Common Market Studies 443-462, 451.
45  ibid
46  M. Smith, ‘Pluralism’, in D. Marsh and G. Stoker (eds.), Theory and Methods in Political Science (Palgrave, 1995), 209-227.
47  cf Maduz, supra n. 7, at 8.
48  Beetham and Lord, supra n. 5.
49  D. Altman, Direct Democracy Worldwide (CUP, 2010); M. Qvortrup, A Comparative Study of Referendums: Government by the 
People (Manchester University Press, 2005); Setälä and Schiller, supra n. 8.
50  Qvortrup, supra n. 49, 156-174.
51  Maduz, supra n. 7.
52  Schmidt, supra n. 27; see also Risse and Kleine, supra n. 27, 73.
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come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process’.53 Social 
psychologists have demonstrated that procedural legitimacy is an important predictor of compliance 
across a great variety of social settings.54 Regarding the ECI, two sub-processes within the Commission are 
relevant: decision-making about registration and follow-up to an Initiative by the Commission. 
The legitimacy of such processes is predicated on three specific standards. A first throughput standard 
is accountability, or the extent to which decision-makers are responsive to input demands, and can be held 
responsible for their decisions.55 We view accountability as a mechanism consisting of three consecutive 
steps: 1) the actor is obliged to inform the forum about his or her conduct – in this case, the way it dealt 
with a Citizens’ Initiative; 2) the forum must be able to interrogate the actor about its conduct; and 3) it 
must be possible for the forum to pass judgment about that conduct, backed by the possibility of impo-
sing a sanction.56 Accountability can operate either horizontally or vertically.57 In our analysis, the former 
refers to other EU institutions, the latter to citizens directly. A second throughput standard is transparency 
of the governance process: citizens must have access to information about the decision-making process 
and particular decisions.58 A third throughput standard is legality, so as to prevent the abuse of power by 
key decision-makers.59 This translates into the requirement that the Commission behaves in line with the 
procedural registration and decision-making requirements contained in Regulation 211/2011.
In sum, the empirical analysis will be based on seven specific criteria, listed in table 1 below. We now 
proceed to our evaluation on that basis, applying the respective criteria to the operation of the ECI.
Table 1: Analytical Framework. 
Legitimacy 
variable
Criterion Specified criterion
Input Equal access Criterion 1: Equal Access. The same conditions for access in different 
Member States.
Representative demands Criterion 2: Qualifiers. Relating to EU law, while not being too 
prohibitive
Criterion 3: Signature quorum. Ensuring broad active support 
Criterion 4: Interest groups. Preventing interest group capture
Throughput Horizontal and vertical 
accountability
Criterion 5: Accountability. Presence of a forum with a) exchange of 
information, b) debate, and c) possible sanctions by both citizens and 
other EU institutions, relating to 1) decision on official registration by 
the Commission, and 2) final Commission decision.
Transparency Criterion 6: Transparency. Information about 1) official registration 
and collection process and, 2) decisions by the Commission should be 
publicly available
Legality of the throughput 
process
Criterion 7: Legality. Does the Commission meet its own procedural 
requirements concerning 1) official registration process, and 2) final 
Commission decision making
53  T.M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (OUP, 1990). 19.
54  Tyler, supra n. 26.
55  Schmidt, supra n. 27, 6.
56  M. Bovens, ‘Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework’, (2007) 13 European Law Journal 447-468, 
457.
57  Schmidt, supra n. 27, Diamond and Morlino, supra n. 40.
58  Schmidt, supra n. 27, 6.
59  Scharpf, supra n. 22, 13.
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4  Analysis – Applying the Legitimacy Criteria to the ECI’s 
Operation
In the first five years of the ECI’s operation, 48 Initiatives were admitted and started with the collection 
of the necessary signatures.60 22 registration requests were refused for falling outside the ambit of the 
Commission’s powers – a delicate issue we will return to below. By the end of 2017, four Initiatives have 
managed to cross both the signature and the geographical threshold, namely Right2Water; One of Us, 
Stop Vivisection and Ban Glyphosate. The topics of the various Initiatives are highly diverse, ranging from 
the recognition of water as a human right, safeguarding media pluralism, to expanding the Erasmus 
programme. In what follows, we apply our legitimacy criteria to the ECI procedure and its actual operation 
during the first quinquennat.
4.1  The ECI’s Operation and Input Legitimacy 
Criterion 1. Equal access. The legal framework stipulates that particular requirements to sign an ECI (ID 
number, address, date of birth, etc.) are set by national governments. As a result, significant variation 
between the Member States exists. In Table 2, we list the requirements up until January 2018.61 In September 
2013, the Commission updated Annexes II and III of the Regulation, thereby amending several requirements. 
Six countries implemented changes (Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, France, Ireland and Slovenia). 
Luxembourg and Ireland relaxed their conditions. Conversely, France moved from a moderately strict to a 
strict position, joining countries such as Austria and Italy which both have the maximum score of six out of 
six possible requirements. In March 2015, a second round of changes was announced. Luxembourg added 
two requirements, while Bulgaria removed two (see Table 2).   
Many civil society groups push for abolishing ID demands specifically, deeming these the most impor-
tant hurdle.62 That claim can at present not be assessed with full accuracy. A first explorative evaluation 
can be conducted though, as the four successful Initiatives, Right2Water, One of Us, Stop Vivisection and 
Ban Glyphosate, published detailed figures with regard to the collected signatures on their respective web-
sites. The latter three experienced no problems reaching the thresholds: they ticked the box in 21, 20 and 
22 countries respectively. The Right2Water Initiative is more interesting as it struggled to get enough sig-
natures in at least seven countries. The relevant numbers show the minimum threshold was crossed in 5 
of the 9 countries without ID-requirements (55.5%), but only in 8 of the 19 countries with ID requirements 
(42.1%). Admittedly, this campaign constitutes a single case only. Facts and figures on a more extensive 
range are needed to gauge the requirements’ true impact. Indeed, alternative explanations can be thought 
of: some Member States have a longer tradition with national agenda initiatives than others, and one may 
even simply expect that some topics are relevant and salient in certain Member States, but not in others. 
Therefore, more successful ECI cases or more detailed data at the Member State level will be needed to 
assess this matter thoroughly, before watertight conclusions can be drawn. 
The broader point remains however that a certain amount of inequality between the Member States 
exists, in the extent to which the ECI provides them with access to the Commission’s legislative agenda. In 
reality, this inequality may even be more extensive, as successful use of the ECI also presumes the presence 
of sufficient resources and adequate organisation. Positive follow-up by the Commission is, moreover, 
likely to be aided by the presence of useful connections with the Commission, EP and other institutional 
actors – qualities that are not equally distributed across individuals and the groups that represent them.
Criterion 2: Qualifiers. It matters a great deal which topics an Initiative may concern. Not all concei-
vable topics can be proposed. An ECI may only deal with issues concerning a policy area where the EU 
60  Eight were withdrawn by the organisers and not re-submitted.
61  No alterations were made since then.
62  cf Berg and Thomson, supra n. 14.
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has competence; and the Commission must have the power there to propose the adoption of a legal act. 
Moreover, as flagged above, it must not be manifestly abusive, frivolous or vexatious; or contravene any of 
the Union’s values contained in Article 2 TEU. These provisions clearly serve to position the ECI squarely 
within the existing indirect democratic mandate underpinning European integration.
Yet, as Altman notes, such qualifiers can be an important ‘entry hurdle’.63  What is crucial is how the 
Commission interprets its powers. So far, it has done so in a remarkably restrictive way.64 For example, 
63  Altman, supra n. 50, 19.
64  In the same sense J. Organ, ‘Decommissioning Direct Democracy? A Critical Analysis of Commission Decision-making on 
Table 2: Registration Requirements.
Country Name Nationality ID-number Place of birth Date of Birth Address Total
Austria YES YES YES YES YES YES 6/6
Belgium YES YES YES YES YES 5/6
Bulgaria YES YES YES YES 
(removed)
YES 
(removed)
5/6 => 3/6
Croatia YES YES YES YES 4/6
Cyprus YES YES YES 3/6
Czech Republic YES YES YES 3/6
Denmark YES YES YES YES YES 5/6
Estonia YES YES YES YES YES 5/6
Finland YES YES YES 3/6
France YES YES YES YES (added) YES YES (added) 4/6 => 6/6 
Germany YES YES YES YES YES 5/6
Greece YES YES YES YES 4/6
Hungary YES YES YES 3/6
Ireland YES YES YES 
(removed)
YES YES 5/6 => 4/6
Italy YES YES YES YES YES YES 6/6
Latvia YES YES YES YES YES 5/6
Lithuania YES YES YES 3/6
Luxembourg YES YES YES 
(removed)
YES YES (added) YES (added) 4/6 => 5/6
Malta YES YES YES YES 4/6
The Netherlands YES YES YES YES YES 5/6
Poland YES YES YES YES 4/6
Portugal YES YES YES YES 4/6
Romania YES YES YES YES YES 5/6
Slovakia YES YES YES YES YES 5/6
Slovenia YES YES YES YES YES 5/6
Spain YES YES YES YES (added) YES 
(removed)
4/6 => 4/6
Sweden YES YES YES YES YES 5/6
United Kingdom YES YES YES YES 4/6
Total 28/28 28/28 18/28 13/28 21/28 15/28
Source: Data collected by the authors and supplemented with information available at http://www.citizens-initiative.eu/. 
Notes: Countries that changed their requirements are put in bold and italic. The Netherlands also relaxed its requirements 
allowing non-resident nationals to sign. Slovenia changed its identity card and passport requirement into providing a 
personal identification number.
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while the TEU and the ECI Regulation do not explicitly rule out that it can call for Treaty amendments, the 
Commission elected to deny that it possesses competence in this regard. Already in the first two years, 17 
(42.5%) proposals were not admitted, allegedly for lying beyond the Commission’s powers. While the per-
centage fell to 30% by the end of 2017, it continues to underscore one main point: the Commission clearly 
possesses an agenda-controlling power here, and the exercise is not a simple technocratic one.65
In the conclusion of an own-initiative inquiry, the European Ombudsman has issued a series of cri-
tical recommendations which did not lead to meaningful alterations.66 Some of the committees that saw 
their proposals rejected instigated judicial procedures in response. In the early cases litigated, the Court of 
Justice proved unwilling to overturn the Commission’s decisions.67 While two more recent rulings suggest 
that annulment is not impossible, the judiciary continues to shy away from a meticulous scrutiny of the 
underlying reasoning.68 Thus, the practice overall suggests that the Commission adopted a rigid approach 
which is not so easy to correct, unless the institutional remedies and prerequisites are recalibrated radi-
cally.
Criterion 3: The signature quorum. As mentioned, an ECI is successful if it attracts one million valid 
signatures. This may seem a high number, but given that the EU has 508 million inhabitants, the threshold 
is actually very low: less than 0.2% of the population needs to sign in order for an Initiative to pass. To indi-
cate just how low this number is, comparatively speaking, consider the following.69 Of the 28 EU Member 
States, 12 have agenda initiative provisions. Across the 28, there exist no less than 23 different national 
procedures, as some Initiatives on e.g. constitutional matters have higher signature quorums than e.g. 
those on ordinary legislative matters. Of these 23 procedures, just two feature a signature quorum lower 
than the ECI’s, namely the Italian agenda initiative (0.08% of the population) and the British e-petitions 
(0.16% of the population). Obviously, whether a quorum is high or low also depends on the circulation 
period: if the period to collect signatures is very short, even a relatively low quorum may be hard to reach. 
In 16 of the 23 procedures the circulation period is six months or lower. The ECI can, instead, circulate for 
12 months, which is again rather permissive. In sum, the formal signature quorum can actually be consi-
dered relatively low. 
One could retort that the ECI also imposes a geographical condition, which makes it more difficult to 
pass the signature quorum. At present, a successful ECI requires a minimum number of valid signatures 
from at least seven Member States. Geographical requirements are not unique to the ECI, but also known 
to e.g. Romanian agenda initiatives and Swiss and Australian citizen-initiated referendums.70 They func-
tion as safeguards against the tyranny of the majority;71 yet in the present case, they actually seem to be 
a safeguard against the tyranny of the minority in the sense of one large country providing the required 
signatures. In practice, the geographical requirement can make the procedure rather cumbersome. Organi-
sers typically collect 25% extra signatures in order to ensure a campaign has enough valid signatures. One 
of the successful Initiatives, the Right2Water Initiative, struggled to pass the threshold in enough Member 
States (see Appendix 1). Indeed, on 22 April 2013, the organisers had already collected 1,465,489 signatu-
the Legal Admissibility of European Citizens Initiative Proposals’, (2014) 10 European Constitutional Law Review 422-443; N. 
Vogiatzis, ‘Between Discretion and Control: Reflections on the Institutional Position of the Commission within the European 
Citizens’ Initiative Process’, (2017) 23 European Law Journal 250-271.
65  Similarly M. Inglese, ‘Recent Trends in European Citizens’ Initiatives: The General Court Case Law and the Commission’s 
Practice’, (2018) 24 European Public Law, 335-362.
66  Decision of the European Ombudsman closing her own-initiative inquiry OI/9/2013/TN concerning the European 
Commission, 4 March 2015, <http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/case.faces/en/42908/html.bookmark> last visited 
10 July 2018.
67  Case T-450/12, Alexios Anagnostakis v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2015:739; Case T-529/13, Balázs-Árpád Iszák and Attila Dabis 
v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2016:282; Case C-589/15, Alexios Anagnostakis v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2017:663.
68  Case T-646/13, Bürgerausschuss für die Bürgerinitiative Minority Safepack v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2017:59; T-754/14, 
Michael Efler and Others v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2017:323.
69  Number adopted from Cuesta-López, supra n. 11, at 261; we added data on the Netherlands (introduction in 2005), the UK 
(2011) and Finland (2012).
70  See, respectively, Cuesta-López, supra n. 11, at 261, and Qvortrup, supra n. 49, at 167.
71  Altman, supra n. 49, 19.
Brought to you by | Radboud University Nijmegen
Authenticated
Download Date | 1/4/19 3:22 PM
86    Ellen Mastenbroek, Henri de Waele
res, but only passed the minimum requirement in five Member States. The campaign collected another 
400,000 before enough Member States were covered.72 Early on, the Right2water campaign had mainly 
been successful in Germany and Austria. Indeed, on 22 April, 82.1% of the total number of signatures came 
from Germany, and another 4.5% came from Austria. As such, one can argue that the Initiative was heavily 
skewed, especially towards German signatures. However, when the signature collection period ended on 
3 September 2013, the proportion of German signatures had declined to 74.8%, and the Austrian to 3.5%. 
It was still skewed, but the organisers had realized the need to campaign outside Germany and Austria, 
attracting broader support for their cause.
Criterion 4. Interest group capture. To avoid interest group capture, all donations exceeding EUR 500 
must be registered. Appendix 1 provides an overview of the donations of the first 15 Initiatives. Strikin-
gly, though it was originally expected that a successful ECI would cost one euro per signature, even the 
successful Initiatives attracted at best EUR 100,000 in funding. The case of the (withdrawn) Initiative EU 
Directive on Dairy Cow Welfare is instructive. The Initiative collected no less than EUR 345,567 in funding 
– of which EUR 90,934 was donated by Ben & Jerry’s – but was finally withdrawn. Ben & Jerry’s Social 
Mission Manager offered as the rationale for the withdrawal that at the time the instrument was a waste 
of ‘valuable time and resources’.73 Her concerns mainly referred to the inadequate signature collection 
process; but the mere fact that the ECI was not reintroduced once the collection process had been impro-
ved, shows that organisations may feel there are more efficient ways to influence EU decision-making. This 
comes as no surprise; after all, even when an Initiative is successful, this by no means guarantees that 
action is taken by the Commission. This extra check constitutes a second important safeguard against inte-
rest group capture. In sum, ‘[w]hen the ECI Regulation was being developed, many feared that powerful 
interests would use the ECI for their own ends. (...)  These fears have proven groundless’.74
Overall then, several criteria for input legitimacy are met by the ECI framework relatively well. The 
signature threshold is fairly low, and the circulation period seems appropriate. The same holds for the 
geographical requirements: while they do make it more difficult to pass the threshold, they certainly do 
not make it impossible, and ensure diversity in the country-base from which the support is derived. The 
ECI procedure also seems to do a good job in guaranteeing that Initiatives are not captured by special 
interests. At the same time, quite some differences exist regarding the conditions for signing an Initiative, 
which presents us with at least a hint of unequal access. Furthermore, one could note that the geogra-
phical requirements may well ensure regional diversity, but nevertheless introduce an additional hurdle. 
Most important are the qualifiers. Deciding whether or not a topic is allowed is by no means a technocratic 
exercise and greatly affects the instrument’s actual usage. Lastly, the fact that special interests have not 
captured the ECI because they think it inefficient, ironically, also highlights that those initiating an ECI 
have to overcome a substantial number of hurdles, while the outcome is merely a request to the Commis-
sion to introduce legislation.
4.2  The ECI and Throughput Legitimacy
Criterion 5. Accountability. As argued above, it matters greatly to which extent decision-makers can be 
held responsible for their decisions. Applied to the ECI, we need to assess whether the main actors can be 
held to account in forums where they are obliged to explain and justify their conduct (horizontal accoun-
tability). In fact, the EU features the preferred three-tier mechanism, whereby the Commission is firstly 
obliged to elaborate on how it deals with ECIs through official decisions and periodic reports, and in law-
suits brought before the Court of Justice. The Parliament and the Ombudsman are also able to subject its 
72  The other two successful ECIs passed the geographical threshold early on.
73  See Compassion in World Farming/World Society for the Protection of Animals, ‘Press Release – Supporting Better Dairy 
urges European Commission to rethink the European Citizens’ Initiative’, <https://www.ciwf.org.uk/includes/documents/
cm_docs/2012/p/pr201207.pdf > (last visited 10 July 2018).
74  Berg and Thomson, supra n. 13, 73.
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practices to a closer scrutiny, and proceed with a more elaborate interrogation and critical review. Lastly, 
the Court, the Parliament and the Ombudsman are able to pass judgment on those practices. Ultimately, 
the Court may decide to annul a Commission decision, and the Parliament could adopt political sanctions 
(with a motion of censure as ultimum remedium). While not immediately efficacious, the Ombudsman’s 
‘naming and shaming’ strategy should not be discounted here either.75
Less is clear about the vertical accountability of the ECI process. As noted above, the ECI instrument 
was officially evaluated at the end of 2015 and in mid-2018, but for present purposes these occurrences are 
rather less persuasive, since the reviews were conducted by the Commission itself. However, on several 
occasions we have seen an ad hoc creation of forums of vertical accountability where the Commission 
attended and responded to organisers’ complaints about the process. The Commission has also shown 
that it is willing to listen to and assist organisers facing difficulties.76  For example, it generously extended 
the deadline for the first Initiatives. In July 2012, it offered to host ECIs on its own servers, alleviating the 
troubles reported by some organisers. In September 2013, the Commission considerably streamlined the 
registration process. In early 2015, it introduced the practice of partially registering Initiatives, which by 
2018 it intends to cement in a recast Regulation.77 Overall then, the Commission seems fairly responsive 
when it comes to technical issues: it actively engages with the arguments of critics, and adapts its proce-
dures where necessary. However, it may be doubted whether this willingness to listen and act remains 
as high once an ECI has collected enough signatures. Indeed, this is the moment where most national 
initiatives become problematic, as it often is unclear what the rights of organisers are.78 In case of the ECI, 
organisers are granted three important certitudes: an official hearing at the Parliament, a motivated reac-
tion from the Commission, and the option to contest the latter by proceeding to the Court. While perhaps 
not optimal, this package of rights is more extensive than for many national equivalents (where often no 
judicial remedies are available). From this perspective therefore, the level of accountability still seems 
adequate. One cautionary remark does need to be made, as the significant variety in treatment that the 
successful Initiatives received during the official hearing is striking. Indeed, while the hearing on the first 
of these (Right2Water) resulted in an open, high quality debate, the two subsequent ones met with a much 
less favourable reception.79 This suggests that in practice, the European institutions involved are able to 
influence the substantive quality of the hearing in a significant way, which is clearly a matter of concern.  
Criterion 6. Transparency. Most of the ECI’s procedural steps are fairly transparent. The Commission’s 
website presents information on all ongoing, withdrawn and rejected Initiatives. It provides the legal and 
technical information about the registration process, the final verdict of the Commission, and the official 
letters of rejection. Interestingly, while the official reason for rejecting a registration request has always 
been the same (namely that the proposed Initiative falls manifestly outside the ambit of the Commission’s 
powers), the accompanying letters by the Commission provide more detailed background information. 
The procedure therefore seems to be most transparent up until the end of the signature collection phase.
The Right2Water, Stop Vivisection, One of Us and Ban Glyphosate campaigns showcase how this trans-
parency is admirably retained afterwards. The Right2Water Initiative was accepted by the Commission, 
and each of the follow-up steps remained transparent: each further step taken was published online; all 
reports of meetings and press releases were archived, and made publicly available. Stop Vivisection and 
Ban Glyphosate resulted in mixed responses, and again all information was made publicly available. The 
One of Us Initiative was rejected, and did not trigger legislative action. Initially, communication was rela-
75  Though cf R. Rawlings, ‘Engaged Elites: Citizen Action and Institutional Attitudes in Commission Enforcement’, (2000) 6 
European Law Journal 4-28.
76  Berg and Thomson, supra n. 13.
77  European Commission, supra n. 19.
78  Setälä and Schiller, supra n. 8.
79  Compare ‘Hearing in European Parliament Great Success!’, <http://www.right2water.eu/news/hearing-european-
parliament-great-success>, and ‘Initiator of Successful ECI Stop Vivisection Reveals Shocking Treatment by EU Institutions’, 
<http://www.citizens-initiative.eu/shocking-treatment-eu-institutions> (last visited 10 July 2018).
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tively minimalistic and slow here. After complaints by the organisers however, the Commission issued a 
detailed press release outlining the reasons why the Initiative was not adopted.80 
Criterion 7. Legality. This criterion requires an evaluation of whether the Commission conforms to 
the applicable procedural standards. Its initial scrutiny of a proposed ECI, described above, is limited to 
assessing whether the proposal is not manifestly abusive, frivolous, vexatious, or contravenes the Union’s 
values as set out in Article 2 TEU, or manifestly fall outside the ambit of the Commission’s powers. The 
Commission clearly enjoys sizeable discretion to determine whether a proposal should be deemed unlaw-
ful or inadmissible. At the same time, this does not mean that no fetters should be deemed to apply on that 
discretion. Moreover, the case can be made that in the exclusion of the overwhelming majority of proposed 
Initiatives, an inconsistent practice has been followed that falls foul of the appropriate legal benchmarks.81 
As remarked though, in its first pronouncements on the Commission’s assessments, the Court was unable 
to find fault with the Commission’s assessments. While more recent judgments did lead to annulment, the 
Union’s judiciary is unlikely to engage in a more searching review in the near future.82 At this point, it may 
therefore suffice to point out that the rejection grounds employed are in conformity to those mentioned in 
the implementing Regulation; that the Commission fully complied with its duty to respond to successful 
Initiatives; that it supplied a proper motivation for its decisions in virtually all dossiers; and that it duly 
adhered to the applicable timeframes. On these counts, ECI practice has so far lived up to the legality cri-
terion.
5  The ECI’s Legitimising Potential for the EU – Looking Back and 
Thinking Forward
In light of the foregoing, the somewhat surprising conclusion is that the ECI should be considered to 
command a reasonable measure of legitimacy already. To many, however, this assertion may reflect a 
counter-intuitive ‘paper reality’, at odds with the unsatisfactory experiences of the various campaigners. 
On this cue, it could justifiably be asked whether the instrument may ever succeed in attenuating the 
legitimacy deficit of the EU – i.e. the weak foundation of its perceived, and continuously contested, ‘right 
to rule’.
The core benefits of the ECI remain clear: it enables citizens to place items on the agenda that are 
otherwise ignored or overlooked, due to entrenched political preferences. Accordingly, it has been descri-
bed as a form of ex ante non-majoritarian input in the policy process.83 Of course, the specific institutional 
structure and decision-making process should be accounted for here, keeping in mind the EU’s unusual, 
quasi-federal setup. In this respect, it is noteworthy that the very same instrument has a different consti-
tutional place and significance in a system as the present one, where the monopoly to come up with pro-
posals officially lies with the Commission (but is de facto overtaken ever more frequently by the European 
Council84) – than in national systems, where a more central position is allocated to the representative body 
80  ‘European Citizens’ Initiative: European Commission replies to “One of Us”’, Brussels, 28 May 2014, <http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_IP-14-608_en.htm> (last visited 10 July 2018). After the respective hearings, it took the Commission two 
days to respond to the Right2Water Initiative and 23 days to respond to the Stop Vivisection Initiative, but it took almost seven 
weeks to respond to the One of Us ECI (see <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/followup_actions/citizens_initiative_
en.htm>, last visited 10 July 2018).
81  See, extensively, A. Karatzia ‘The European Citizens’ Initiative in Practice: Legal Admissibility Concerns’, (2015) 40 
European Law Review 509-530, 511-524.
82  In the same sense M. Inglese, ‘Positioning Efler in the Current Narrative of European Citizens’ Initiatives’, (2017) 3 European 
Papers 1-10.
83  Dougan, supra n. 11, p. 1813.
84  See e.g. C.J. Bickerton, D. Hodson and U. Puetter (eds.), The New Intergovernmentalism (OUP, 2015); but cf F Schimmelfennig, 
‘What’s the News in ‘‘New Intergovernmentalism’?’, (2015) 53 Journal of Common Market Studies 723-730; H. de Waele, ‘Strained 
Actorness: The ‘New’ European Council in Theory and Practice’ in E. Fahey (ed), The Actors of Postnational Rule-Making 
(Routledge, 2015), 103-104 and 108-109.
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(compared to the still less powerful role played by the European Parliament). Still, the ECI is evidently 
capable of expanding and strengthening democratic participation in the Union’s everyday life, exactly 
because of the comparatively weaker position of the EP. It thus also forms a complement to the (indirectly 
legitimising) role played by national governments, based on the legitimacy derived from representative 
democratic systems at the Member State level, as well as to the model of technocratic legitimacy under-
pinning the centrality of the Commission (which until the birth of the ECI was not controlled in a direct 
democratic fashion). In sum, it results in the creation of a richer palette of vectors of legitimacy than was 
previously the case. 
In addition, the modus operandi of the ECI allows for a transnational dialogue and solidarity to take 
root, contributing to the establishment of a (sense of) collective community. It stimulates the creation of a 
common deliberative space, and the construction of durable interaction between grassroots movements, 
governmental and non-governmental actors – as illustrated by the ‘Stop TTIP’ Initiative, among others.85 
Consequently, even when the results repeatedly led to disappointments, the operationalisation of the ECI 
seems to have had a positive impact on the legitimacy of the EU, and brought Europe (somewhat) closer 
to its citizens.86  What is more, in line with the general literature on instruments of direct democracy, we 
could expect it to serve as a less direct, preventative tool – signalling possible ‘red lines’ for EU regulation.
When reviewing recent practice, one could object that the new agenda-setting opportunities have sur-
reptitiously been seized by single issue movements and NGOs (‘instrumental capture’). Prima facie, the 
successful campaigns convey the impression of representing a large number of persons, originating from 
different corners of the Union. Yet, if the signing up of the required number within the fairly short time 
frame can in practice be mainly attributed to the efficiency of the organisers, often already established 
organisations (as in the cases of Right2Water, One of Us, Stop Vivisection and Ban Glyphosate), the true 
allegiance and sympathy of that million-plus may be wafer thin. Additionally, given the powerful and 
democratically legitimate checks and balances in the Union’s legislative procedure, and the various ways 
to ensure representativeness of demands inserted by the ECI, we should qualify the risks and downsides of 
such instrumental capture. One may even argue that it allows for minorities to have access to EU decision-
making in a way that was previously unthinkable, adding to the complexly balanced political system the 
Union has developed into. So, whereas interest group access to the agenda may compromise representa-
tive democracy, as has been noted in the general literature on direct democracy, the EU’s unusual setup 
offers adequate checks and balances to prevent minority dominance over the legislative process.87
Lastly, it should be pointed out that the legitimising potential of the ECI appears greatly hampered by 
an inherent design flaw that – even when the procedural framework may be considered sensible, balan-
ced and functional – is an inevitable cause of disillusion. The crude general message that has crept into 
many minds is that the citizens are now able to express their wishes, and will be listened to as long as their 
ideas are sufficiently supported by others. Yet, the Union simply does not possess competencies across the 
board, so that some requests are bound to fall on deaf ears; even in areas of shared power, it often cannot 
lawfully proceed in the way envisaged by the organisers.88 Confronted with flawed presumptions and false 
expectations, the Commission can then only be misunderstood, and accused of selectively following-up 
those Initiatives that are in line with its own priorities –  a classic case of blaming the messenger. Even 
85  See e.g. J. Organ, ‘EU Citizen Participation, Openness and the European Citizens Initiative: The TTIP Legacy’, (2017) 54 
Common Market Law Review 1713-1747.
86  Cf C. Berg, ‘Commission ignoring the ECI’s positive potential for democracy’, <http://www.euractiv.com/section/eu-
priorities-2020/opinion/commission-ignoring-the-eci-s-positive-potential-for-democracy> (last visited 10 July 2018), opining 
that: ‘All serious ECIs united campaigners across borders, brought the EU directly into the daily lives of ordinary citizens 
and introduced new actors to the EU policy arena. Several ECIs even promoted overt pro-European integration goals, such 
as Fraternité2020 to strengthen EU youth mobility programs, For a High Quality European Education for All to expand the EU 
educational model, and Let Me Vote to support EU citizen mobility by strengthening democratic participation. Even ECIs that 
put EU policy into question help to strengthen the European project by encouraging healthy democratic debate.’
87  Maduz , supra n. 7, 8.
88  Similarly A. Karatzia, ‘The European Citizens’ Initiative and the EU Institutional Balance: On Realism and the Possibilities 
of Affecting EU Lawmaking’, (2017) 54 Common Market Law Review, 177-208.
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when the Commission’s mediating role is slightly more pronounced, and its discretion a bit larger than it 
would acknowledge, the negative outcomes strengthen the belief that the EU-at-large does not genuinely 
care, and that the ECI was merely devised as a public relations exercise.89 In result, the choice for institu-
tional mediation, though arguably offering a healthy safety-valve, is cast in a similarly bad light. Despite 
performing its new tasks in good faith, taking pains to make clear that the extant rules and conditions 
need to be properly complied with before it can offer any follow-up at all, the Commission thus involun-
tarily inflicted damage on its reputation as an honest broker. Whereas the public perceptions are nigh 
impossible to counter, the solution might reside in a radical adjustment to the procedural framework not 
contemplated in current reform suggestions: a conscious curbing of the existing discretion in the ECI Regu-
lation – either by explicit amendment, or by issuing guidance on how to determine when a subject matter 
is ‘manifestly abusive, frivolous or vexatious’, and ‘manifestly outside the Commission’s competence to 
submit a proposal for a legal act for the purpose of implementing the Treaties’.90 If that proves untenable, 
perhaps a reconsideration is in order of the minimalist conception contained in Article 11(4) TEU, to better 
cater to the apparent needs and concerns of Union citizens – especially when the EU continues to be atta-
cked even when it is fully entitled to resist an application (a tendency from which its legitimacy obviously 
does not stand to gain at all). 
6  Conclusion
The ECI was launched in April 2012 as a daring experiment in direct democracy. Up to 2018, more than 
nine million citizens have taken part. This paper has analysed the instrument’s legitimising potential vis-
à-vis the EU, by evaluating its operation against seven normative criteria under the rubrics of input and 
throughput legitimacy. Applying these criteria to the first years of its operation, we may conclude that the 
ECI can lay claim to some input legitimacy, partly due to its relatively thresholds for participation and the 
available methods for guaranteeing that special interests are unable to capture the instrument. This goes 
some way towards countering the criticism of the instrument’s usefulness and viability. 
On the downside however, geographical requirements, while ensuring diversity, impose an extra 
obstacle. Moreover, the conditions for signing up to an Initiative differ across countries, which presents at 
least a hint of unequal access. How the Commission has hitherto interpreted its own powers constitutes a 
further cause for anxiety. Given that an ECI may only deal with topics where the Commission is competent 
to introduce legislation, a restrictive interpretation may constitute a significant entry hurdle; and indeed, 
an uncomfortable number of proposed ECIs have not been accepted for registration. Hence, a risk looms 
large of too many topics being excluded, and relatively non-controversial topics being admitted. The Par-
liament, or from a different angle the Ombudsman, may pressure the Commission to engage in follow-up 
nonetheless, but even then, a positive outcome remains far from assured. Conversely, concerning through-
put legitimacy, the ECI procedure features a laudable measure of transparency. In addition, the applicable 
legal standards have not been seriously violated, even when the preliminary scrutiny practice does lack 
a certain consistency (as sanctioned by the Court). Finally, judging from recent practice, the procedure 
appears to offer a sufficient measure of accountability as well. Overall then, the question whether the ECI 
possesses at least the potential to enhance the legitimacy of the EU, can be answered in the affirmative. 
89  Compare e.g. the incisive comment of Berg, supra n. 86: ‘Any Euroscepticism generated by the ECI comes from the 
Commission’s own actions that limit citizen participation and increase the gap to citizens, not by the ECI instrument itself.’
90  As proposed in the study of the European Citizen Action Service, The European Citizens’ Initiative Registration: Falling at 
the First Hurdle? (ECAS, 2014), 17-18. In comparison, the recommendations of the European Ombudsman (supra n. 66) that the 
Commission should ‘endeavour to provide reasoning that is more robust, consistent and comprehensible to the citizen’ and 
‘in its formal response to an ECI that has obtained one million signatures, should explain its political choices to the public in 
a detailed and transparent manner’ arguably focus on the symptoms, and the procedural adjustments suggested there amount 
to little more than marginal tinkering.
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It was subsequently noted however that, whilst the instrument itself has been operationalised in a 
legitimate manner, and clearly possesses the ability to enhance the Union’s legitimacy, actual experience 
suggests that the latter has remained underdeveloped. The causes are believed to lie not so much in the 
instrument itself, which grants citizens unprecedented access and recognition. It rather appear to be the 
high hopes and demands of ECI organisers on the one hand, and the Commission’s necessarily restrained 
application of the rules on the other, that produced a palpable sense of disenchantment. The risk that too 
many proposals would come to naught has indeed materialised, damaging the legitimacy of the EU and 
its institutions, even while the underlying motives for the exclusions and rejections cannot legitimately be 
questioned. Arguably this quandary can only be resolved by a radical adjustment of the procedural frame-
work or – albeit politically by no means palatable – the instrument’s primary law foundations.
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